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Inflation expectations, persistence and monetary policy 
Ramon Moreno and Agustín Villar 
Monetary policy is often based on the idea that policymakers can achieve reductions in 
inflation by producing some economic slack. How much slack is needed in turn depends on 
the degree of inflation persistence; if persistence is low, the output costs to disinflation will be 
small. Inflation persistence has posed a major challenge for monetary authorities in emerging 
market economies (EMEs) over the years and is believed to have been a factor behind the 
failure of a number of stabilisation programmes seeking to end periods of very high inflation.
1 
Even in areas where inflation has been relatively moderate, such as the euro area, inflation 
persistence has been a special concern because of the perceived costs of price and wage 
rigidity. 
Contemporary macroeconomic analysis (including now standard open economy models 
relying on the New Keynesian Phillips curve or extensions) identifies inflation expectations as 
the key determinant of inflation persistence. In this scenario, a monetary policy framework 
that can successfully anchor inflation expectations can reduce or eliminate persistence.  
To shed further light on the role of expectations this note briefly reviews: (1) factors that can 
lead to inflation persistence and how a monetary policy framework such as inflation targeting 
can offset these; (2) whether inflation persistence has declined in recent years; (3) whether 
inflation targeting has succeeded in anchoring inflation expectations and factors that could 
loosen this anchoring effect; and (4) the measurement of inflation expectations in EMEs.  
Inflation expectations, persistence and inflation targeting  
One of the key issues for monetary policy is how to lower inflation persistence, so as to lower 
the costs of disinflation. Recent research suggests two general explanations for such 
persistence. 
First, backward-looking expectations. Some research for developed countries suggests 
that some proportion of agents is backward-looking (Roberts (1998)) although the proportion 
may be small (Galí and Gertler (1999)). One interpretation of backward-looking expectations 
is departures from rationality. While such departures are usually seen as a shortcoming 
when attempting to explain data, there is some empirical support for them. For example, a 
recent study (Mankiw et al (2003)) finds that survey data from both consumers and 
professional economists show significant departures from rationality, including substantial 
disagreement about expected future inflation, autocorrelated forecast errors, and insufficient 
sensitivity to recent macroeconomic news.
2  
Inflation may also behave as if there were backward-looking expectations in the presence of 
wage and price indexation (see, for example, Vargas et al (2009, this volume), Fraga et al 
(2003)). This may be particularly important in EMEs, where such indexation is much more 
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prevalent than in developed economies (see Moreno (2009, this volume) and Lefort and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2002)).  
Second, inflation persistence can arise because private agents have limited information 
about central bank objectives. Models in which agents learn about policymakers’ 
objectives over time include those found in Erceg and Levin (2003) and Orphanides and 
Williams (2007). They show that inflation tends to be less persistent if agents are more 
certain about the central bank’s inflation objectives.
3  
While further research is needed to uncover how inflation expectations could be best 
anchored to reduce persistence, it is apparent that inflation targeting could play an important 
role. For example, in Erceg and Levin’s model, agents need to disentangle whether a given 
inflation outcome reflects a shift in the inflation target or a transitory disturbance. This 
provides a rationale for a monetary framework that is transparent and credible, as well as for 
effective communications by the central bank. Agents would then find it easier to recognise 
the inflation target more quickly, thus reducing the persistence of inflation and output.
4 Many 
of these characteristics (eg transparency, communications procedures) are formally 
incorporated into inflation targeting regimes, which a number of EME central banks have 
adopted over the past two decades.  
An important question is the extent to which a monetary framework such as inflation targeting 
could also reduce the prevalence of backward-looking expectations or departures from 
rationality. For example, it would be desirable to have a better understanding of whether 
inflation expectations in EMEs exhibit similar departures from rationality to those apparently 
observed in developed economies and to assess possible explanations (eg Mankiw et al 
(2003) argue that, in the United States, updating expectations is costly). This could suggest 
solutions that would improve forecast efficiency. Research on this topic could draw on the 
data on inflation expectations now collected in EMEs (see discussion below).  
A better understanding of the effects of price and wage indexation on persistence under a 
more transparent monetary regime would also help shed light on this question. Fraga et al 
(2003) argue that better anchored expectations due to a credible inflation targeting regime 
could also lead to a fall in the fraction of backward-looking agents caused by indexation, thus 
reinforcing the reduction of inflation persistence. They cite some evidence for Brazil 
consistent with this view.
5  
Has inflation persistence fallen? 
There is a fair amount of evidence that inflation persistence has fallen in some developed 
countries; but the experience of EMEs appears to vary. For example, one measure of 
inflation persistence is the sum of coefficients on lagged inflation. Williams (2006) estimates 
a Phillips curve model for the United States in which current quarter inflation depends on four 
lags of inflation, the unemployment rate in the previous quarter (which controls for the effect 
of labour market slack on inflation), and a constant. He finds that the sum of coefficients on 
lagged inflation appears to have fallen considerably, with point estimates for coefficient sums 
ranging from around unity for the 1980–Q2 2006 sample, to 0.6 for core personal 
                                                  
3   Desormeaux et al (2009) apply a similar kind of reasoning in the Central Bank of Chile’s contribution to this 
volume. Also in line with this view, Vargas et al (2009, this volume) cite a Colombian central bank study by 
Gonzalez and Hamman that suggests that lack of credibility may have played a role in explaining high 
persistence of inflation in Colombia. 
4   Fraga et al (2003) stress the importance of greater transparency and communications to offset factors that 
may weaken the credibility of an inflation target (see below). 
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consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation and 0.4 for core CPI inflation for the Q4 1999– 
Q2 2006 period. However, the decline in persistence is not statistically significant, reflecting 
the imprecision of the estimates and the difficulties in reaching conclusions about whether 
inflation persistence has indeed fallen. Nevertheless, the impression of reduced inflation 
persistence in the United States is reinforced by a recent study by Stock and Watson (2007). 
They decompose inflation into a trend component that follows a random walk (ie no reversion 
to mean) and a serially uncorrelated shock (implying transitory deviations around the trend), 
and show that the volatility of the (highly persistent) trend component has fallen while that of 
the temporary component has risen. One implication of this is that, because shocks are now 
largely mean-reverting, the persistence of inflation has tended to fall. A study of developed 
economies by Levin and Piger (2002) also finds that inflation persistence has declined.  
Some of the evidence from recent studies, or reported in papers for this meeting, suggests 
that inflation persistence may still be high in a number of EMEs. For example, Capistrán and 
Ramos Francia (2006) find that inflation persistence has fallen in some EMEs while 
remaining high in others. In the Colombian central bank’s contribution to this volume, Vargas 
et al (2009) report that consumer price inflation in Colombia during 2003 and 2006 exhibits 
some persistence related to the long-lasting response of tradable and regulated price 
inflation to overall inflation shocks and persistence in some shocks (eg tradable goods and 
food). For another example, in Peru shocks to core inflation die out only after about two 
years (see Armas et al (2009, this volume)). 
As to whether inflation persistence has fallen more in countries that target inflation, a study of 
advanced economies and EMEs (Kuttner and Posen (2001)) suggests that inflation 
persistence has indeed declined more in those EMEs that have formally adopted inflation 
targeting.  
Has inflation targeting resulted in better anchored expectations? 
Research relating to developed economies generally suggests that inflation targeting has 
resulted in better anchored expectations (see Walsh (2008)).
6 Furthermore, using a measure 
of inflation expectations implied by bond yields, Gürkaynak et al (2006, 2007) find that in the 
United States, long-term inflation expectations react to news while they do not in inflation 
targeting Sweden, Canada or Chile. Evidence from the United Kingdom also supports the 
view that (credible) inflation targeting anchors expectations, as expectations responded to 
news prior to 1997, when the Bank of England became independent, but not after. In a study 
of developed economies, Levin et al (2004) find that lagged inflation is significantly correlated 
with expectations of future inflation in non-IT countries but not in inflation targeters. Ravenna 
(2008) estimates a DSGE model of Canada to generate counterfactual experiments; these 
predict lower inflation volatility under inflation targeting largely because of the effect of IT on 
expectations. 
Questionnaire responses and papers contributed to an earlier Deputy Governors’ meeting 
(see BIS (2008)) provide further insights into the behaviour of inflation expectations in EMEs. 
Summarising some of the results of papers and questionnaire responses, Mohanty and 
Turner (2008, p 20) report that a number of EME central banks find that inflation expectations 
have been better anchored in this decade, as indicated by growing convergence of private 
sector inflation expectations around the central bank’s inflation target (eg in Colombia, the 
Czech Republic, Mexico and South Africa); a stronger reaction of financial markets to central 
                                                  
6   An exception is a study of six inflation targeting and six non-targeting developed economies (Johnson (2002)). 
This study finds that while the adoption of inflation targeting was followed by a significant decline in expected 
inflation, the variability of expected inflation in targeters and non-targeters remained the same, suggesting that 
inflation targeting does not anchor expectations.  80  BIS Papers No 49
 
bank policy announcements has been recorded; and there has been an improvement in 
central banks’ ability to reduce the size of policy adjustments. Some of the findings are 
illustrated by a paper in that volume by Bevilaqua et al (2008). They cite: (1) a decline in 
inflation uncertainty, as indicated in lower forecast errors measured as the difference 
between 12-month actual and expected inflation; (2) reduced dispersion of inflation 
expectations, as measured by reduced disagreement among survey respondents providing a 
point inflation forecast; (3) a lower risk premium implicit in longer-term interest rates; and 
(4)  the fact that inflation targets are significant attractors for inflation expectations. In 
particular, a regression of inflation expectations on a constant and the inflation target during 
a recent “normal” period shows an intercept of zero and a slope coefficient close to unity.  
While expectations appear to have become better anchored in EMEs in this decade, an 
important concern is that large shocks that have periodically affected EMEs could loosen 
inflation expectations from their anchor. For example, in Brazil, according to the indicators 
cited by Bevilaqua et al (2008), inflation expectations do not appear to have been well 
anchored in the period around 2002 and early 2003, when there was great uncertainty about 
fiscal policy. However, they were relatively well anchored before and after that period (see 
Figures 5–11 of their paper, and also Graph 1 below). Significant changes in the behaviour of 
inflation expectations in Turkey are also discussed by Basci et al (2008).  
Graph 1 
Inflation and policy rates 




























1    Twelve-month changes in consumer prices, in per cent.       
2    Twelve months ahead. Based on surveys 
conducted by the respective central bank; observations are positioned in the month when the forecast was made;
annual changes, in per cent.       
3    Twelve-month changes in core consumer prices, national definition, in per 
cent.    
4  Brazil, overnight SELIC rate target; Chile, official monetary policy rate.    
5  Announced targets, in terms 
of CPI inflation. 
Sources: IMF; Bloomberg; Consensus Economics; national data. 
In this context, one could ask whether inflation expectations have become more loosely 
anchored in the most recent period of financial turbulence, large fluctuations in commodity 
prices in EMEs, and concerns about the outlook for growth. More systematic analysis is 
needed but some perspective can be gained from Graph 1, which shows inflation 
expectations and inflation indicators for Brazil and Chile. In Brazil, both actual and expected 
inflation began rising in 2007 and by mid-2008 exceeded the midpoint of the target range 
(but remained within the target ceiling). In Chile, inflation expectations had remained stable 
for a long period, but large terms-of-trade movements were eventually associated with a 
sharp rise in inflation, and an eventual rise of expectations above target as well. In Israel, 
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(see discussion of Figure 4 in Eckstein and Segal (2009), the Bank of Israel’s contribution to 
this volume). In contrast, Hampl (2009), in the contribution of the Czech National Bank to this 
volume, finds that inflation expectations have remained well anchored by the inflation 
targeting framework.
7  
One explanation for why expectations lose their anchor is that the public may perceive that 
institutional or economic factors may make it very difficult for the central bank to meet its 
inflation target. Fraga et al (2003) cite three factors that remain relevant today. 
1. Fiscal dominance. Here unsustainable fiscal policies delink inflation expectations from the 
target because agents believe the target would be too costly to maintain. One concern is that 
with a large public debt overhang, tighter monetary policy could lead to higher sovereign risk 
premia (by increasing the probability of default on debt), depreciation pressures and higher 
inflation (see Blanchard (2004)). EMEs have made significant gains in fiscal consolidation but 
public debt to GDP ratios remain high in a number of countries, and the perceived need for 
fiscal stimulus in response to weakening global demand could pose concerns.  
2. Financial dominance, in which weak financial sectors could make it too costly for monetary 
authorities to stick to their inflation targets. Here, improvements in banking supervision and 
regulations appear to have led to more robust EME banking sectors. However, continued 
pressures in global financial markets pose risks, particularly in the aftermath of the 
disruptions observed since September 2008.  
3. Large external shocks. While EME resilience has increased, exposure to external shocks 
has also increased due to growing trade and financial integration. For example, starting 
around the first half of 2008, capital inflow reversals and sharp depreciation pressures 
accentuated inflation concerns, prompting central banks to intervene in foreign exchange 
markets, to tighten monetary policy or to defer easing. However, such actions had to be 
weighed against the risks of sharp slowdowns in growth. Real shocks also pose important 
concerns. As noted in a number of central bank contributions to this volume, terms-of-trade 
shocks have contributed to inflationary pressures in recent quarters that have in some cases 
pushed actual and expected inflation well above the ceilings of the inflation target (see 
eg Graph 1). At this time, disinflationary or deflationary pressure due to weak demand and 
sharp declines in commodity prices could generate a new set of challenges through their 
impact on expectations. 
Measuring inflation expectations 
The previous sections have highlighted some channels by which inflation and inflation 
expectations could interact. However, inflation expectations are not directly observable, and 
this has resulted in significant efforts to measure them (Table A1). A natural place to start is 
those markets in the economy where inflation expectations play a central role.  
Household and business surveys 
Inflation expectations are crucial for the functioning of labour markets, as they are a primary 
consideration in wage negotiations. Wage pressures in turn can influence pricing behaviour. 
In economies where labour market developments are thought to have a greater impact on 
inflation dynamics, inflation expectations of labour market participants are important for 
policymakers. The inflation expectations of workers and firms are usually measured through 
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household and (non-financial) business surveys. However, such surveys raise a number of 
issues.  
First, household surveys are expensive because the population surveyed tends to be 
relatively large and heterogeneous.  
Second, heterogeneity can pose problems of interpretation. Brischetto and de Brouwer 
(1999) find that average inflation expectations can vary widely for different types of survey 
respondents. People with better access to information or more developed information 
processing skills tend to have more accurate inflation expectations. 
Third, surveys could be subject to large measurement errors. The incidence of measurement 
errors is a key determinant of the quality of the inflation expectations estimate, and these 
errors can be large when measuring inflation expectations through household surveys. In 
economies where expectations are volatile, answers could be affected by unfolding events if 
the time span between interviews of survey respondents is long. Smyth (1992) tests errors in 
the measurement of inflation expectations in households and concludes that such estimates 
are (positively) biased, because households tend to overestimate the inflation rate they 
experience. Policy decisions based on biased inflation expectations could raise concerns.  
Fourth, surveys (particularly household surveys) are not conducted often, so they generate 
relatively low-frequency data. In economies where inflation is muted this is not a problem but 
when inflation is a major policy concern their usefulness might be reduced.  
Professional forecasters and financial market participants 
Surveys of financial market participants’ or corporate sector expectations on inflation 
(conducted by central banks or the private sector) are now relatively common in EMEs. While 
a smaller and homogeneous population helps attenuate some of the concerns associated 
with household surveys, there are other concerns. 
One concern is that market participants might not face adequate incentives to provide their 
best prediction, leading to biased estimates.
8 Producing an “unbiased” estimate would 
require information on the direction of the bias, which might not be possible in a relatively 
small sample. One solution has been to increase the payoff to market participants who give 
accurate estimates. In Brazil, the central bank survey has asked market participants to 
forecast price indices at one month and up to two years. The forecasts are collected weekly 
and the central bank computes several statistical measures that are published according to a 
schedule. More significantly, the central bank publishes monthly the forecasters’ ranking 
according to the accuracy of their forecast. It is known that this ranking implies commercial 
and financial gains for those in the top places. This approach appears to be particularly 
appropriate if updating expectations is costly, as in the analysis of Mankiw et al (2003). It is 
worth noting that in their contribution to this volume, Central Bank of Brazil researchers 
provide evidence that inflation expectations in Brazil are unbiased (Araujo and Gaglianone 
(2009)). 
One survey of market analysts widely used in producing estimates of inflation expectations is 
the Consensus Forecast. This commercial survey is produced monthly for a large number of 
EMEs. It provides inflation forecasts one and two years ahead. Disclosure of the individual 
respondents’ forecasts helps alleviate some of the concerns cited earlier. Another advantage 
is that the forecasts are produced independently from the government. While many central 
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banks have been granted operational independence, faced with a possible conflict with the 
government a central bank might opt for self-censorship. 
Central banks may also produce and publish their own inflation forecasts, which can provide 
an estimate of inflation expectations over the forecasting horizon. A shortcoming is that these 
forecasts assume policy invariance: the central bank performs its computations under the 
assumption that its monetary policy instruments remain unchanged. This might be 
supplemented with some forecast discussion that might provide some additional information 
about likely policy direction and how it might affect the forecast. Central banks in some small 
open advanced economies have tried to improve this inflation expectation estimate by 
incorporating the most likely policy interest rate paths over the forecasting horizon. 
Financial market measures 
Financial markets have become a major field for gauging inflation expectations. The growth 
of financial markets has raised the availability and profile of asset price based measures and 
of financial market participant surveys. The high-frequency data in financial markets can 
provide timely observations of inflation expectations. Furthermore, because financial markets 
tend to process large and frequent amounts of information about the economy, market 
participants are very well informed and capable of fairly sophisticated analysis. One 
advantage of these measures is that estimation bias is likely to be small: financial market 
participants back their views on inflation by taking positions that expose them to risk. 
In many developed financial markets the existence of inflation-linked financial securities 
provides a market-based measure of inflation expectation as well as attitudes toward inflation 
risk. Long-term inflation-linked government bonds in principle create opportunities for 
deriving inflation expectations from asset prices. The difference in the rate of return of 
inflation-linked bonds and a nominal rate (the “break-even rate”) would offer a market-based 
measure of inflation expectations. Some EMEs (eg Chile or Israel) have been able to 
develop an inflation-linked government bond market, but in most cases such markets do not 
exist. An important issue is how to disentangle inflation expectations from other factors that 
may be embedded in the break-even rate. Break-even rates can be decomposed into at least 
three components: (i) expected inflation during the remaining maturity of the bonds; 
(ii) inflation risk premia; and (iii) liquidity premia. Technical factors specific to each market 
may also play a role. Sometimes, the expected inflation component is extracted by using 
expectations from professional forecasts (see above). In the case of the United States such 
(longer-run) expectations have been stable, and it appears that most of the recent volatility in 
the break-even rate is attributable largely to liquidity premia (a higher liquidity premium would 
increase the yield on real bonds relative to nominal bonds and recently a flight to safety 
lowered the nominal rate for Treasury securities). Thus, the break-even rate appears to give 
a relatively noisy signal of inflation expectations at this time.  
To sum up, the measures of expectations discussed above can offer very useful sources of 
information for purposes of macroeconomic analysis, for central banks and researchers. 
Among the questions one could ask are: (1) what are the properties of the data (eg forecast 
accuracy, autocorrelation) and what do they reveal about how agents form expectations 
(eg are they rational, do they use information efficiently and so on); (2) what do measures of 
expectations tell us about how expectations behave over the business cycle and the main 
drivers of such expectations; (3) how well anchored are inflation expectations, during normal 
times and during episodes of economic or financial stress; and (4) what are the implications 
for monetary policy frameworks and implementation?
9 
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Sources: Central banks; BIS. 
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